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Abstract
Improving the environmental performance of non-domestic 
buildings is a complex problem due to the participation of mul-
tiple stakeholders. This is particularly challenging in tenanted 
spaces, where landlord and tenant interactions are regulated 
through leases that traditionally ignore environmental consid-
erations. ‘Green leasing’ has been conceptualized as a form of 
‘middle-out’ inter-organisational environmental governance 
that operates between organisations, alongside other drivers. 
Green leases form a valuable framework for tenant–landlord 
cooperation within properties and across portfolios. This paper 
offers a comparative international investigation of how leases 
are evolving to become ‘greener’ in Sweden, Australia, and the 
UK, drawing on experience from an IEA project on behaviour 
change and a UK project on energy strategy development. It 
considers how stakeholder retrofit opportunities and interac-
tions in non-domestic buildings are shaped by the (1) policy 
context in each country (e.g., the EPBD, NABERS, and MEES) 
and (2) prevailing leasing practices in each country. Based on 
this analysis, the paper develops a new market segmentation 
framework to accentuate the different roles that public sector 
organisations and private property companies play as both ten-
ants and landlords across countries. We suggest that national 
government policies assist the public sector in leading on better 
leasing practices, whereas international certification and bench-
marking schemes (e.g., BREEAM & GRESB) may provide more 
fuel to private sector tenants and landlords. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the fit between property portfolios and poli-
cies, suggesting that international green lease standards might 
assist multinational tenants and property owners in upgrading 
both their premises and their operational practices.
Introduction
Improving the environmental performance of non-domestic 
buildings is a complex problem due to the participation of 
multiple stakeholders. This is particularly challenging in ten-
anted spaces, where landlord and tenant interactions are reg-
ulated through leases that traditionally ignore environmental 
considerations. Tenanted space can account for 50–70 % of the 
non-domestic building market (Janda et al. 2016; PIA 2015). 
In this context, standard lease arrangements have been consid-
ered to be a potential barrier to energy upgrades, “green leases” 
a possible solution, and “green leasing” to be an evolving form 
of inter-organisational environmental governance (Janda et 
al. 2016). A ‘green’ lease is an addition to the standard legal 
contract between landlord and tenant. It places these parties 
under mutual obligation to improve the environmental per-
formance of a building, with a primary focus on energy man-
agement, through cooperation (Sayce et al 2009). Green leases 
do not only benefit the environment, but may also create mu-
tual financial benefits for both the tenant and the landlord. An 
energy management plan, which may be annexed to a green 
lease, includes details about the technical and non-techni-
cal measures and commitments put forward by both parties 
(Woodford 2007). Energy savings potentials are large (e.g. Fei-
erman 2015) but depend on how much potential there is as 
well as how well the co-operation between parties – an ulti-
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mate outcome of a successful green leasing arrangement – is 
working. The term “green leases” usually reflects a change to 
the wording of a formal lease document; “green leasing” re-
flects a change to the relationship between the landlord and the 
tenant, which may be through the mechanism of the lease or 
through other channels. 
Interest in green leases is growing, and the last decade has 
seen a number of published articles about their use or develop-
ment in different countries, including the UK (Langley & Hop-
kinson 2009; Hinnells et al. 2008; Bright & Dixie 2014; Bright 
& Patrick 2016; Patrick, Bright & Janda 2017 (forthcoming)), 
Ireland (IGBC 2016), Australia (Roussac & Bright 2012; Wood-
ford 2007; Janda et al. 2016), Sweden (Wikensten & Nilsson 
2016; Lind, Bonde & Zalejska-Jonsson 2014), Norway (Collins, 
Junghans & Haugen 2016; Collins & Junghans 2015), Singapore 
(Chua 2014), the US (Meister Consultants Group 2014; Kaplow 
2009; Oberle & Sloboda 2010), Canada (Sayce et al. 2009), and 
20 countries across Europe (Duquesne 2011).
Green leases are meant to provide a valuable framework 
for tenant–landlord cooperation within properties and across 
portfolios. However, there might be barriers affecting the de-
velopment of the green leasing practice, such as if the leas-
es are developed from a landlord’s point of view, leaving the 
tenants with the feeling of inequality, or if the energy savings 
are not translated into the expected financial savings (Swed-
ish Energy Agency, 2013). In addition, the ambition levels of 
adopted green lease schemes vary, with some stricter schemes 
imposing punitive measures for a party that do not meet the 
targets, whereas others can be of a voluntary nature and often 
lead to ‘greenwash’. Are there certain kinds of owners or ten-
ants that are more “cooperative” than others? And what role 
can public policy play in encouraging this cooperation? This 
paper considers these questions through two lenses. First, it re-
views opportunities for collaboration in the usual conception 
of the commercial property industry, which is often construed 
as private property companies renting space to private com-
mercial tenants. Our paper’s second lens starts with a broader 
and more unusual conception of the commercial property in-
dustry, which incorporates the fact that non-domestic build-
ings are not just for businesses.
This paper offers a comparative international investigation of 
what we currently think and know about green lease evolution 
in Sweden, Australia, and the UK, drawing primarily on experi-
ence from an IEA project on behaviour change (IEA DSM Task 
241) and a UK project on energy strategy development (WICK-
ED2). It considers how stakeholder retrofit opportunities and 
interactions in non-domestic buildings are shaped by (1) the 
public policy context for energy & non-domestic buildings in 
each country, (2) prevailing leasing practices in each country, 
and (3) the presence, absence, and availability of quantitative 
energy data. Based on this analysis, the paper develops a new 
market segmentation framework to accentuate the different 
roles that tenants and landlords play in green leases, and also 
the role that public sector organisations play as both tenants 
and landlords across countries. We suggest that national gov-
ernment policies assist the public sector in leading on better 
1. www.ieadsm.org/task/task-24-phase-2/
2. http://www.energy.ox.ac.uk/wicked/
(green) leasing practices, whereas international certification 
and benchmarking schemes (e.g. LEED & GRESB) provide 
more scope to private sector tenants and landlords, particularly 
those that are themselves multinational. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of initial efforts to develop an international 
standard for green leases, which would assist multinational ten-
ants and property owners in upgrading both their premises and 
their operational practices.
Literature review: corporations, inter-organisational 
governance, and property
This section reviews literature that may be useful for framing 
the role of green leases as tools for non-domestic building gov-
ernance. The literature on corporate environmental governance 
(CEG) and voluntary environmental programmes (VEPs) pro-
vides some guidance, but it also has some gaps. To more fully 
address the role of leases in tenanted property, the CEG and 
VEP concepts are augmented with perspectives on ‘middle-
out’ change (Parag & Janda 2014; Janda & Parag 2013), ‘build-
ing communities’ (Axon et al. 2012), and strategic property 
management (Edwards & Ellison 2004). As a vehicle for envi-
ronmental governance, the lease is an incredibly flexible tool. 
Each tenanted property has at least one lease; in multi-tenanted 
properties there may be many. Each lease is negotiated between 
the landlord and tenant or their representatives, yet most nego-
tiations start from an institutionalised base or “precedent lease” 
that is amended for particular circumstances. These amend-
ments can be legally binding and enforceable, or they can be 
suggestions of good practice. Most importantly for tenanted 
commercial property, however, leases are inter-organisational 
agreements that codify the landlord-tenant relationship for a 
specified length of time, in real property markets. Green leases 
have yet to be introduced to, and implemented across all prop-
erty markets. Previous green lease research has focused on their 
application in buildings (Bright & Dixie 2014; Collins, Jung-
hans & Haugen 2016), corporations (Collins & Junghans 2015), 
or countries (Janda et al. 2016; Bright & Patrick 2016; Patrick, 
Bright & Janda 2017 (forthcoming)). This paper looks at the 
intersection of different levels of governance, with a particu-
lar focus on the overlap of national governance and property 
portfolios.
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMES
Research identifies various factors involved in corporate gov-
ernance of environmental problems. This work normally fo-
cuses on initiatives within firms or across similar firms (e.g., 
Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese 2008; Prakash & Potoski 
2006; Borck & Coglianese 2009; Gouldson & Sullivan 2014) and 
it shows that an organisation’s willingness to engage in ‘beyond 
compliance’ environmental programmes is shaped both by ex-
ternal conditions (regulation, economic and social) but also by 
a range of internal interacting factors, including management 
style, organisational culture and structure. In their review of the 
VEP literature, Borck and Coglianese (2009) note three types 
of businesses that are likely to participate in VEPs: (1)  larger 
businesses, as they have greater resources to participate and 
may benefit most from recognition, (2) businesses with inter-
nal cultures supportive of environmentally-friendly behaviour, 
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and (3) businesses that face (or are likely to face) stricter gov-
ernment regulations. Borck and Coglianese (2009) reviewed 
the literature and present a typology of three different kinds of 
VEPs – unilateral (led by businesses or industry associations), 
bilateral (negotiated between government and specific busi-
nesses), and public voluntary (used by governments to recog-
nise achievements beyond mandatory standards – depending 
on the number of participating businesses and on the degree of 
governmental involvement. In this typology, green leases could 
be characterised as a bilateral VEP in Australia, whereas they 
arose unilaterally in the UK and Sweden. Insofar as green leas-
ing can be considered as a particular form of VEP, the VEP liter-
ature provides useful insights into types of external and internal 
drivers for CEG. However, this literature does not address inter-
organisational governance or property-level issues.
Looking at the corporate response of UK supermarkets to 
climate change, Gouldson and Sullivan (2014) argue that pol-
icy analysis tends to focus on one of two things: (1) the role of 
public environmental policies (either regulatory or voluntary) 
that are external to the firm, or (2) corporate social responsi-
bility policies that are internal to the firm. Gouldson and Sul-
livan (2014) combine these dimensions by addressing strong 
and weak ‘governance from the outside’ as well as strong and 
weak ‘governance from the inside’. Importantly, they look at the 
strength and alignment of these factors over time, as well as 
the extent to which they inter-relate (see Table 1). A complete 
alignment of internal corporate conditions with governmental 
pressure can induce ‘collective action’; a lack of interest of both 
government and business leads to ‘collective inaction’. Great-
er pressure from government produces a ‘socially-led’ market; 
greater interest from business results in ‘business-led’ activity.
INTER-ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE: MIDDLE-OUT CHANGE
Inter-organisational activities, particularly between dissimilar 
groups (like landlords and tenants), are often conceptualised as 
a space where ‘intermediaries’ serve an important role (Fisch-
er & Guy 2009; Moss et al. 2009; Moss 2009). Janda and Parag 
(2013) and Parag and Janda (2014) augment this literature with 
new perspectives on ‘middle actors’, including designers, build-
ing professionals, and commercial real estate companies. Mid-
dle actors have their own agency and capacity to foster innova-
tion from the ‘middle out’ rather than merely reacting to policy 
push from the top-down or market pull from the bottom-up. 
A middle-out approach recognises the influence of these ac-
tors upstream (e.g., to policy makers), downstream (e.g., to cus-
tomers and clients), and sideways (e.g., to other middle actors). 
IEA DSM Task 24 has taken on the language of ‘the Middle 
Actor’ and added it into its ‘Behaviour Changer Framework’ 
(Rotmann 2017 (forthcoming), 2016). The Task 24 framework 
is a multi-stakeholder collaboration tool utilised in participa-
tory action research settings, including on Swedish green leases 
in commercial office buildings. This paper conceptualises land-
lords and tenants as middle actors in the property market, who 
are able to exert influence sideways through private-private 
contracts.
THE ROLE OF PROPERTY
Neither the CEG literature nor the middle-out perspective con-
sider the role of property, which is critical to both leases and 
leasing practices (i.e. the processes, engagement, negotiations 
and decisions relating to the agreement of a lease). Axon et al. 
(2012) outline an interdisciplinary ‘building communities’ ap-
proach to reducing energy use in tenanted property. This ap-
proach highlights the importance of three levels: (1) the general 
policy context, (2) the role of organisations, and 3) the level 
of the building itself, including the particular characteristics 
of both the premises and the stakeholders. These authors call 
for more research on the role of leases and their practical ef-
ficacy in effecting change. The current paper contributes to this 
challenge. Edwards and Ellison (2004)’s research on corporate 
property management suggests that organisations have vary-
ing perspectives on the importance of physical property rela-
tive to their core business. For some corporates, the building is 
integral to their core business strategy; for others it is merely a 
container in which work happens. For landlords and investors, 
for example, the building is the business; tenants, however, may 
only see its value as an operational asset, not as a physical as-
set. These different perspectives are at the heart of the tenant/
landlord divide. This paper considers whether green leasing 
can help overcome this split incentive.
Methods
Evidencing change in leasing practices is difficult and complex. 
The property market is global, but tenanted buildings are lo-
cated and operated in particular physical, social and political 
contexts, all of which can affect leasing practices. Each tenanted 
unit has its own lease, and multi-tenanted buildings have mul-
tiple leases. Leases expire at the end of a fixed term, which may 
be in 1 year or 99 years. Leases are treated as commercially con-
fidential. Although the land registries in Sweden and Australia 
are electronically accessible and searchable, in the UK public 
Strength and alignment of internal governance conditions.
Low High
Strength and 
alignment 
of external 
governance 
practices.
High Socially-led Collective action
Low Collective inaction Business-led
Table 1. Interactions between external and internal governance (Source: Fig. 1 Gouldson & Sullivan (2014), p. 2977).
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records of the contents of agreed leases are not electronically 
accessible or searchable. There is not yet an internationally-
standardised method of classifying leases as ‘green’.
This paper draws together evidence of research on green 
leases and energy policies in Sweden, the UK, and Australia. 
The Swedish experience is drawn dominantly from a pilot study 
(Wikensten & Nilsson 2016) done in cooperation with the In-
ternational Energy Agency’s Demand-Side Management Pro-
gramme’s Task 24: Phase II – Helping the Behaviour Changers. 
The UK and Australian evidence is drawn dominantly from 
a research project on energy management in non-domestic 
buildings, called WICKED, as well as other previously pub-
lished papers. Each of these projects is discussed below.
TASK 24 DESCRIPTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The Demand-Side Management (DSM) Programme is one of 
more than 40 co-operative Energy Technology Initiatives with-
in the framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA). To 
date, 25 research tasks have been initiated to look at DSM issues 
from a variety of technological, political and behavioural per-
spectives. Task 24 is called Behaviour Change in DSM and was 
initiated in early 2012. It was the first global research Task fo-
cusing solely on behaviour change. The various tools developed 
and used by the Task are described in a paper in these ECEEE 
proceedings (Rotmann 2017 (forthcoming)). As one of its ini-
tiatives, Task 24 has facilitated multi-stakeholder collaboration 
with Swedish ‘Behaviour Changers’ in three workshops to date. 
In the first workshop (June 2015), an issues definition (Sub-
task 6) was undertaken, which led to the decision to focus on 
green leases in office buildings as the area of highest (techno-
logical, economic, societal and political) potential with the low-
est risk. In the second and third workshops (March 2016 and 
October 2016), the ‘Behaviour Changer Framework’ (Rotmann 
2016) was used to visualise the current energy system relating 
to green leases. It delved into the main mandates, stakeholders, 
restrictions and tools of each of the Behaviour Changers (Sub-
task 7) that were present. A Swedish background study (Wiken-
sten & Nilsson 2016) has been prepared, which includes results 
from a literature review, informal conversations with ten stake-
holders (property owners, tenants and experts in the field), and 
6 semi-structured interviews with five property owners and one 
tenant. In an upcoming workshop, a pilot will be co-designed 
by all Behaviour Changers and then trialed by the Swedish En-
ergy Agency. It will focus on how to take green leases into green 
leasing – a co-creation between landlords and tenants which 
includes evaluation of multiple benefits to all parties.
WICKED DESCRIPTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The WICKED (Working with Infrastructure Creation of 
Knowledge, and Energy strategy Development) project investi-
gated energy strategy development in the retail sector through 
a combination of top-down big data analytics, middle-out or-
ganisational analysis, and bottom-up empirical data collection. 
It was funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Re-
search Council and ran from 2014–16. “Green lease” findings 
from the WICKED project are based on semi-structured in-
terviews with industry experts and participants (29 interviews 
with 38 representatives of 25 different organisations), as well 
as analysis of company strategy reports, green lease clauses in 
company templates, and model green lease clauses promoted 
by industry partnerships, and a review of policy documents 
and industry reports. In addition, some partners shared large 
energy data sets; others allowed the project access to their 
premises to collect new real-time data (Janda et al. 2015). A 
separate paper in these proceedings explores the limits of big 
data in quantifying the impacts of green leases across a single 
retail property portfolio (Granell et al. 2017 (forthcoming)). 
Other papers include a comparison of green lease development 
in the office and retail sector in the UK and Australia (Janda 
et al. 2016), a paper looking at the potential interrelationship 
of the UK Minimum Energy Efficiency Standards (MEES) and 
green leases (Patrick, Bright & Janda 2017 (forthcoming)), and 
a paper drawing primarily on interviews with UK lawyers that 
explores (1)  the significance of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, (2) the uptake and content of green clauses, (3) drivers of 
green clauses, (4) resistance to green clauses, and (5) the impact 
of green clauses (Bright & Patrick 2016).
Using this material as a basis, this paper further explores the 
relationship between green leases, the Energy Performance of 
Building Directive (as applied in Sweden and the UK), and the 
Australian NABERs scheme.
Context: Energy policy and green lease practice
SWEDEN
Swedish Policy Context
Sweden has a target to reduce energy intensity by 20 % from 
2008 levels by 2020 and the Swedish government, has put for-
ward a proposal in late 2016 to cut energy intensity by 50 % 
from 2005 levels by 2030 (Regeringscansliet 2016, 2014). Un-
der the Energy Efficiency Directive of the EU, there is also a 
national annual energy reduction target of 1,5 % at end-user 
level between 2014 and 2020. In addition to the requirements 
following directly from the EU’s Energy Performance of Build-
ings Directive (EPBD) and the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(EED), the Swedish buildings and tertiary sector are targeted by 
several policies. The first Swedish building regulations (BBR) 
came into practice in 1993, and these have been updated reg-
ularly. The new building regulations place higher demands on 
energy efficiency, with the most recent regulations requiring 
about a 20 % reduction compared to the first BBR (Holmberg 
2015). The Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) is a labelling 
scheme, used when buildings are let or sold, which is an asset 
rating based on operational data.
There is a voluntary sustainability rating system called “Miljö-
byggnad”, which rates existing and new buildings according to 
their environmental performance. Based on the criteria cover-
ing energy performance, indoor environment, and materials 
and chemicals, buildings can qualify for three degrees of certifi-
cation: bronze, silver or gold (SGBC 2011). There are no credits 
available for green leases under Miljöbyggnad, but results from 
evaluation seminars with relevant stakeholders indicate some 
interest for the incorporation of green leases in the qualifica-
tion criteria (SGBC 2015). Sweden also has technology procure-
ment groups, which create and maintain economies of scale by 
supporting knowledge exchange between actors within specific 
building market segments. Currently there are five such groups, 
namely BeBo for (large-scale) landlords, BELOK for landlords 
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renting commercial space, HYLOK for the public sector, BeLivs 
for the food processing and distributing sector and finally Be-
små for energy efficiency in new and renovated single-family 
houses. An estimated 20 % of commercial space and 70 % of 
apartments are included in these groups (Holmberg 2015). 
The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning has 
recently (2017) been commissioned to establish an information 
center for renovation and energy efficiency where companies, 
organisations and individuals can turn for information. The 
aim is to give target groups a better basis for renovations and 
new construction. In addition, funding is available for SMEs to 
apply for an energy audit with a maximum support of 50 % of 
the cost. Only SMEs can apply for the check since large compa-
nies fall under a separate law on energy audits.
Swedish green lease practice
Landlords and tenants in Sweden have been co-operating with 
respect to energy for about two decades, and work to formalise 
this co-operation into contracts/leases has been ongoing for 
about a decade (Wikensten & Nilsson 2016), supported by 
BELOK. BELOK is a group of 21  large Swedish commercial 
property owners (non-residential property) collaborating to 
increase energy efficiency (Belok 2017). From 2006–2008, BE-
LOK undertook a study with the aim to present contract tem-
plates which would help stakeholders formalise their co-op-
eration. This resulted in several forms of incentive contract 
templates, differing slightly due to “warm” or “cold” rental leas-
es.3 In 2010–11, Fastighetsägarna (the Swedish Property Fed-
eration) started their work on “green leases”, which resulted in 
an appendix contract/lease to be added to existing contracts 
(Fastighetsägarna 2017). Fastighetsägarna has adopted energy 
and environmental targets, including 20 % improved energy ef-
ficiency by 2020 compared to 2008 levels, and a 40 % reduction 
of emissions and the exclusion of fossil fuels. Their appendix 
contract (mainly for office buildings) was finalised in 2013, and 
soon became the market standard. To date, some 2,500 green 
leases have been signed.
Despite this large apparent market uptake, there has not been 
any coordinated effort to evaluate outcomes. This includes both 
Fastighetsägarna’s green lease and other tenant/landlord coop-
erative activities. Some issues arise around the need to change 
the way in energy is metered. The BBR encourages a strict di-
vision between property energy (fastighetsenergi) and tenant 
energy (electricity; verksamhetsel). However, tenant behaviour 
affects the property’s energy use. If this strict division was 
changed, there may be further incentives to co-operate. Much 
focus has been on the property owners/landlords, but tenants 
have also expressed a desire to have a discussion forum. One 
good example of co-operation is that between Vasakronan and 
Houdini Sportswear. Vasakronan calls itself “the world’s first cli-
mate neutral real estate company” and Houdini Sportswear is “a 
sustainable outdoor brand” (Houdini 2017). They are co-devel-
oping new sustainable business models and want to inspire oth-
ers to follow their path. Similarly, Försäkringskassan (The Social 
Security Agency), was first approached by Vasakronan to sign a 
green lease agreement and continued to demand it for their fu-
3. The difference between these two is the way in which the heating is included/
excluded from the rent.
ture agreements in various locations (Forsakringskassans 2016). 
They have now signed 36 green leases for their premises.
UK
UK policy context
UK building regulations set out specified energy efficiency re-
quirements for new commercial buildings as well as renovations 
(DECC 2014). In compliance with the EU EED (EP&C 2012), 
the UK has a national energy efficiency target to reduce energy 
consumption by 18 % in 2020 relative to the 2007 business-as-
usual projection, and a target of 1,5 % annual reduction between 
2014 and 2020 (DECC 2014). The Carbon Reduction Com-
mitment (CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme requires companies 
that consume over 6,000 MWh of electricity to report and buy 
allowances for their CO2 emissions (DECC 2015a). In addition, 
under the new Energy Saving Opportunities Scheme (ESOS), 
large organisations are required to carry out an energy audit 
every four years, measuring and reporting energy use across 
buildings, industrial processes and transport (DECC 2015b). 
In response to the EU Energy Performance of Buildings Direc-
tive (EPBD), the UK has developed two separate building labels. 
The main labelling scheme, used when buildings are let or sold, 
is the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) which is an asset 
rating based on modelled data. EPCs rate properties based on 
age, size and building fabric and are required when buildings are 
constructed, let or sold (e.g., DECC 2014). Operational ratings, 
based on actual energy consumption data, are called Display 
Energy Certificates (DECs) and are currently required only in 
public buildings (DECC 2014). From April 2018, minimum en-
ergy efficiency standards (MEES) are being introduced, which 
will stop properties that fail to achieve a prescribed MEES set an 
EPC rating E (DECC 2015c). Only MEES recognise the impor-
tance of tenanted commercial property. In parallel, the voluntary 
sustainability rating system ‘BREEAM’ (Building Research Es-
tablishment Environmental Assessment Methodology) provides 
a common standard to enable the assessment and comparison of 
the environmental impact of buildings. It has been used to certify 
over 260,000 building assessments across more than 50 countries 
(BRE 2014). Under BREEAM, 2011 credits were available for 
green leases, which incentivised owners seeking the highest rat-
ing to negotiate green leases with occupiers. On-line commen-
taries suggest this was ‘unpopular’, partly because tenants did not 
want to accept additional obligations, and BREEAM 2014 has 
removed the green lease credits (Parker 2014).
UK green lease practice
The UK Better Buildings Partnership was established in 2007 
to work collaboratively with leading landlords ‘to develop so-
lutions to improve the sustainability of existing commercial 
building stock and achieve substantial CO2 savings’ (UK BBP 
2015). UK BBP members include ‘the UK’s leading commercial 
property owners’ (UK BBP 2015). It developed a toolkit provid-
ing a menu of ‘green clauses’ that parties can elect to include in 
leases and that provide a framework for cooperation. In addi-
tion to green leases, the UK BBP has also promoted Memoran-
da of Understanding (MoUs). As they “are not legally binding, 
[and] can be updated … without amending the lease” (UK BBP 
2013, p. 2), they provide a flexible mechanism for enabling col-
laboration for buildings that are already let. 
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Case study research in the UK has shown that green buildings 
do not always have green leases (Bright & Dixie 2014). Bright & 
Dixie (2014) studied 26 leases drawn from BREEAM-certified 
buildings and found that 40 % of the leases had no discernible 
green clauses. Sixty percent contained one or more green clauses, 
and these varied significantly in their content, scope and legal 
commitment. In a wider study of the UK retail sector, Janda et 
al. (2016) found green leasing is taken up in offices more than 
in retail, with green leases proactively driven by landlords rather 
than tenants. One notable exception is the British retailer, Marks 
& Spencer (M&S). To date, M&S has implemented green leas-
es and written agreements about environmental improvements 
with multiple landlords in more than 80 of its stores, with plans 
for more. The study remarks that the important drivers for the 
M&S leasing policy were ‘strong leadership and concern about 
climate change’. It also notes that this retailer’s brand and size 
gives it some sway in the leasing arrangements, and that the re-
tailer began implementing its green lease policy by working with 
BBP landlords first, before addressing other landlords.
AUSTRALIA
Australian policy context
The Building Code of Australia Part J sets minimum standards 
in respect of energy efficiency requirements for new commer-
cial buildings and for refurbishments over a certain level of 
work (ABCB 2010). However, unlike the UK, where minimum 
energy standards were introduced in the early 1980s, energy 
efficiency only became part of the Australian Building Code 
in 2006. Subsequently, a much lower proportion of the existing 
stock has minimum standards. There is an intention to increase 
minimum energy standards over time and they were revised 
upwards in 2010 (ABCB 2010). Alongside the mandatory min-
imum standards, the Australian commercial office and retail 
property market is characterised by the National Australian 
Built Environment Rating (NABERS) system, which has tools 
for energy and water ratings. In 2010, The Building Energy Ef-
ficiency Disclosure Act, established the Commercial Building 
Disclosure (CBD) Program, which requires energy efficiency 
information to be provided when commercial office space of 
2,000 square metres or more is offered for sale or lease (Aus-
tralian Government 2015). These standards are performance 
ratings (like DECs in the UK) and are made public in the form 
of Building Energy Efficiency Certificates or BEECs. The goal is 
to improve the energy efficiency of Australia’s office stock and, 
also, to inform buyers and tenants. The rationale is that buyers 
and tenants can easily ascertain the level of energy efficiency 
and many will choose buildings with better standards that align 
with their leasing practices and/or corporate social responsibil-
ity policy. The voluntary Green Star environmental rating tool 
also sets energy standards which increase in line with the dif-
ferent star ratings. In comparison to the UK (discussed above), 
Australia has less ambitious CO2 reduction goals.
Australian green lease practice
In Australia, the Australian Commonwealth and State Govern-
ments provided important early leadership for green leases. 
Australian Government agencies occupy almost 2,6 million m2 
of office accommodation, which accounts for approximate-
ly 13 % of the Australian commercial office property market 
(Woodford 2007). In conjunction with the 2006 Energy Effi-
ciency in Government Operations (EEGO) policy, standards 
were set for all new government leases of more than 2,000 m2 
through the use of a “Green Lease Schedule” (GLS; ibid).
The Sydney Better Buildings Partnership was established 
2011. Like BELOK and the UK BBP, Sydney BBP aims to work 
collaboratively with leading landlords. Its founding members 
include 14 of Sydney’s “leading commercial and public sector 
landlords” who have been joined by a further 9 organisations 
(Sydney BBP 2017b). The Sydney BBP also developed a tem-
plate that provides a menu of ‘green clauses’ that parties can 
elect to include in leases (Sydney BBP 2013). Initially, this tem-
plate did not include MoUs due to the costs of negotiation and 
their non-binding nature. However, recent updates to the Syd-
ney green leasing project have included MoUs as well as the first 
“leasing standard” (Sydney BBP 2017a). Launched in Septem-
ber 2016, the BBP Leasing Standard includes a compliance logo 
and a lease scoring system. This enables organisations to mea-
sure their approach to better leasing on a scorecard, ranging 
from compliant (<25 %) all the way through to a silver (>50 %) 
or gold (>75 %) badge. Organisations are able to utilise the rele-
vant logo across reports, surveys and advertising as evidence of 
their commitments to better leasing. Beyond the leases and as-
sociated benchmarking, the Sydney BBP also collaborated in a 
project called “The Tenants and Landlords Guide to Happiness” 
(Blundell 2013). This book showcases “real life examples where 
shared intentions have assisted tenants and owners to collabo-
rate and achieve better outcomes, productivity and amenity.”
The Sydney BBP has also provided quantitative evidence 
of the uptake of its leasing efforts in the market place. In De-
cember 2014, the Sydney BBP published the “BBP Leasing In-
dex,” covering office leasing in Sydney’s central business district 
(CBD) (Dawson, Bailey & Thomas 2014). To compile the index, 
the BBP analysed leases from the public register in New South 
Wales (Thomas & Dawson 2014), using the Sydney BBP’s Mod-
el Lease Clauses to define “green” terms (Sydney BBP 2013). 
Over 500 of 7,000 commercial office leases were sampled. Leases 
were analysed for the presence of one of 22 Model Lease Claus-
es. The study found there was a quadrupling of some form of 
green leasing between 2008 and 2014. In 2013/14, 80 % of leases 
in prime buildings had green lease leasing and included (on aver-
age) about 10 Model Lease Clauses. Clauses relating to coopera-
tion, management and recycling, waste and consumption were 
most frequently included. Nearly a quarter of leases included a 
clause relating to securing or maintaining a NABERS rating. The 
next most common clauses relate to information sharing, envi-
ronmental sustainability (a high-level commitment clause) and 
waste reduction. Despite this growth in the numbers of green 
clauses used, clause strength still lags, indicating that parties 
agree to collaborative frameworks but hesitate to risk dispute res-
olution. Although green leases have been successful in the Aus-
tralian office sector, qualitative assessments suggest that they are 
unusual in Australian retail markets (Janda et al. 2016).
Discussion and conclusions
Consistent with Borck and Coglianese (2009), the evidence 
across Sweden, the UK, and Australia show that early adopters 
of green leases are large organisations with environmentally-
friendly internal cultures facing (the possibility of) strict gov-
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ernment regulations. Unlike Borck and Coglianese, however, 
leaders in green leases include a broad group of landlords, ten-
ants, and governmental organisations.
Following Gouldson and Sullivan (2014), who provide a 
2 × 2 matrix on interactions between external and internal 
corporate environmental governance, Table  2 provides a 
matrix of inter-organisational environmental governance. 
It shows the relative strength of landlords and tenants in 
developing green leases. Where both have low interest in 
environmental practices, there will be collective inaction. We 
have seen this in all three countries in sub-prime markets. 
Where the landlord has more interest than the tenant, the 
landlord will lead. Ordinarily, the landlord has the precedent 
lease to give to potential tenants, so landlord-led green leasing 
is in keeping with standard practice, and it is probably the 
most common form of green leasing, as we saw in the three 
countries we reviewed. When a powerful tenant places 
higher priority on environmental practices than the landlord, 
however, it may result in tenant-led green leasing. We saw 
this example in Sweden with Försäkringskassan; in the UK 
with M&S; and in Australia with the government and its 
2006 Green Lease Schedule. Where both the landlord and the 
tenant concur that environmental practices are important, 
there will be opportunities for collective action. From a 
market perspective, these collective actions may result in the 
‘greenest’ collaborations. From a policy evaluation perspective 
of green leases, however, they may also be free riders. That is, 
green leases may not be necessary if both the landlord and 
tenant agree to cooperate outside this legal mechanism.
Table 2 suggests that it is not just the lease that matters, but 
also the relative power and interest of the parties negotiating 
over the lease. As Axon et al. (2012) suggest, these circumstances 
vary immensely depending on the stakeholders involved. These 
can include both one-to-one negotiations (small landlords and 
small businesses); one-to-many negotiations (as in a multi-
tenanted office building); and many-to-many negotiations 
(large corporate property owners negotiating with large 
corporate tenants). These varying circumstances complicate 
the extent to which green leasing is likely to develop evenly 
across both geographic markets (e.g., cities and nations) and 
portfolios of both owners and tenants.
Next steps
Further research into the utility of green leases as a public pol-
icy tool could explore how well public policies fit with physical 
property portfolios. Going back to Gouldson & Sullivan’s origi-
nal framework (Table 1), we would expect to see greatest align-
ment where the coverage of external policy drivers matches the 
physical footprint of the owners’ or tenants’ property portfolios. 
For example, multinational companies with international prop-
erty portfolios may have difficulty incorporating national-level 
voluntary policies in every country in which they operate. For 
these owners and tenants, an international standard for green 
leasing might be most effective. Although there is no interna-
tional standard for green leases, one step in this direction is the 
Global Real Estate Sustainability Benchmark (GRESB). Estab-
lished in 2009, GRESB an industry-driven assessment that re-
ports annually on the sustainability performance of real estate 
portfolios around the world (GRESB 2015). The GRESB survey 
includes a section on stakeholder and tenant engagement, part 
of which focuses on the use of green leases and MOUs (Shire 
& Quispel 2013). 
On the other hand, national public policies are most likely 
to align with the internal drivers of organisations that occu-
py, own, and operate properties predominantly in that coun-
try. This geographic perspective encourages conceptualising 
the public sector not just as an owner-occupier, but also as a 
landlord and a tenant. For example, the General Services Ad-
ministration is one of the largest landlords in the United States. 
It owns and leases over 376.9 million square feet of space in 
9,600 buildings, including offices, land ports of entry, court-
houses, laboratories, post offices, and data processing centers 
(GSA 2017). The role of the public sector as a property owner 
and tenant may facilitate further study of green leases, as legal 
documentation, energy data, and activities in the public sector 
are often more transparent than in the private sector.
Previous work comparing public and private organisations 
show a marked difference between their comfortability and use 
of energy feedback to engage employees in energy reduction 
(Bull & Janda 2016). This has to do primarily with differences 
in the “core strategy” of the organisations. In the case of a public 
authority, the central goal is to provide services to its citizens in 
a cost-effective and transparent manner. A for-profit company, 
Table 2. Interactions between landlords and tenants.
Tenant
Strength and alignment of environmental practices.
Low High
Landlord
strength and 
alignment of 
environmental 
practices.
High
Landlord-led green leasing
Examples: 
•	 Sweden: BELOK and Fastighetsägarna
•	 UK & Australia: BBP landlords in prime 
markets
Collective action
Examples: 
•	 Sweden: Vasakronan and Houdini Sportswear
•	 UK: M&S new leases with BBP landlords
•	 Australia: Tenant & landlord’s Guide to 
Happiness
Low
Collective inaction
Examples: 
•	 Sweden, UK & Australia: sub-prime 
markets, smaller landlords
Tenant-led green leasing
Examples: 
•	 Sweden: Försäkringskassan green lease with 
their landlord on Gotland
•	 UK: M&S new leases/MoUs with non-BBP 
landlords; 
•	 Australia: Government GLS
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on the other hand, looks to maximise profit, sometimes across 
national boundaries. Future research could address whether 
and how the public sector differs from the private sector as both 
owners and tenants. In particular, it could address how public 
and private sector commercial real estate portfolios respond to 
government policies and international certification schemes, 
with a particular focus on green leasing.
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SGBC. 2011. MILJÖBYGGNAD – a Swedish certification that 
cares about People and the Environment. Sweden Green 
Building Council (SGBC): Stockholm, Sweden. https://
www.sgbc.se/docman/certifieringssystem-1/163-bro-
schyr-engelska/file
SGBC. 2015. Användarna om nästa version av Miljöbyggnad. 
Sweden Green Building Council (SGBC): Stockholm, 
Sweden. https://www.sgbc.se/docman/miljobyg-
gnad-2015/601-miljobyggnad-pm-om-anvandarnas-syn-
punkter-150914-publ/file
Shire, P., & E. Quispel. 2013. “Benchmarking on track.” Real 
Estate May/June (2013): 48.
Swedish Energy Agency and Swedish National Board of Hous-
ing, Building and Planning (Boverket). 2013. “Analys av 
delade incitament för energieffektivisering – Med fokus på 
energiprestandaförbättrande investeringar” Report 2013: 
32: Eskilstuna, Sweden.
Sydney BBP. 2013. BBP releases model lease clauses. Sydney: 
Sydney Better Buildings Partnership, [Accessed: 3 Febru-
ary 2015]. Available from http://www.sydneybetterbuild-
ings.com.au/2013/bbp-releases-model-lease-clauses/.
Contents Keywords Authors
